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United States with its Monroe Doctrine, and the Soviet Union--where each
block aimed at reducing trade with the other blocks to the lowest possible
level. Eventually the different blocks formed the basis for choosing up sides to
fight World War 11.
Trading blocks, however, need not be seen as a disaster. If we aim at
managing trade between the blocks and not eliminating it, they may in fact be
a vehicle for making the world grow faster than it is now growing. They may
also be a necessary intermediate step on the way to truly integrated open world
economy.
TWO PROPOSITIONS ABOUT THE WORLD
(1) Any organization of world trade, if it is to be successful, must be seen
by all of the participants as something that makes them a winner--
something that allows them to grow faster than they would grow if
they were not a player. If any country sees itself as a persistent
loser, it will simply withdraw and go it alone.
(2) The world is shifting from a single polar economic world where the
United States was paramount to a multi-polar world where there are
three relatively equal poles--the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Where the United States was much richer than the rest by the late 1980s in
terms of per capita international purchasing power, it is just one of a number
of relatively equal countries. As America's position shifted from one of
effortless economic superiority to one of equality, its share of the world's GNP
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Since 1945 the world has been slowly but persistently moving toward an ever
more integrated world economy. The very success of this trend, however, has
undermined its very existence. What was possible in a single polar economic
world centered around the United States becomes impossible in a multi-polar
economic world where Europe, Japan, and the United States are economic peers.
In the next decade the world will be evolving toward three trading blocks--
Europe and some associated ex-British and French colonies, the United States
and the rest of the Americas, Japan and the Pacific Rim--with the trade
between these blocks being more accurately described as managed, rather than
free, trade.
The shift in direction springs from a simple problem. What independent
countries would have to do to make an integrated world economy work in a
multi-polar world is simply beyond what they are prepared to do. Fiscal and
monetary policies have to be coordinated. This requires yielding more economic
sovereignty than anyone is prepared to yield. Each country's economic
operating procedures have to be harmonized--organized in similar ways. No one
is prepared to make the changes that this would require.
To use the words "trading blocks" is to summon up images of disaster. In
the 1930s the world split into trading blocks--the British Empire, the French
Union, the German Grossraumwitschaft the Japanese Co-prosperity sphere, the
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fell from more than half to less than a quarter of the world's total.
This is a favorable development--even for Americans. It is, in the long run,
better to live in a world where others are equally wealthy--even if one is
occasionally envious.
But the very successes of the past make future evolution along the current
track impossible. Economic arrangements that work in a single polar world
simply do not work in a multi-polar world.
THE SHIFT FROM WIN-WIN TO LOSE-LOSE
In the more than four decades since World War ll, everyone played a win-
win game. Imports that looked small to the United States (3-5% of the GNP)
loomed large to the rest of the world because of America's giant relative size.
Export opportunities were abundant for anyone who wanted to sell in the U.S.
market.
These opportunities did not threaten America's economic position since it
could easily export whatever was necessary to balance its international
accounts. America could grow farm products that the rest of the world could
not grow, it had raw materials the rest of the world did not have, and it could
manufacture unique products the rest of the world could not technologically
build. America's exports did not compete with products from the rest of the
world. They filled gaps the rest of the world could not fill.
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Everyone could be a winner. Foreigners could conquer American markets,
but Americans did not care since they had unique non-competitive markets
where they were supreme. Americans did not need to protect their own
domestic markets or conquer existing foreign markets. If foreigners conquered
rich American markets, this merely reinforced America's position as an
economic and military superpower. Foreign successes contributed to American
dominance.
Because of its size America could also serve as a locomotive for the world
economy. Whenever the world threatened to sink into a recession or was
growing too slowly, the U.S. could use its fiscal and monetary policies to
stimulate demand--benefiting both American and foreign producers. With an
American locomotive and American market opportunities, the world economy
performed as it had never performed before.
The net result was win-win. America grew rapidly. The rest of the world
grew even more rapidly. Everyone like the system since they would have
performed much more poorly without the system.
But that very success converted a single polar world into a multi-polar
world. The American locomotive gradually became too small to pull the rest of
the train. A non-competitive export-import environment gradually evolved into
a competitive export-import environment. The green revolution both in the
developed and under-developed world destroyed U.S. markets for farm products.
America shifted from being a large exporter of raw materials such as oil to
being a large importer, and unique manufactured products that the rest of the
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world could not technologically build disappeared as they caught up.
To balance its international accounts the U.S. had to conquer foreign
markets and repeal foreign conquerors. To maintain its role as world
locomotive the U.S. had to go ever deeper into international debt--sell off
ever-larger fractions of its assets. With imports almost twice as large as
exports, there wee simply many more American losers than American winners.
Abroad the faltering U.S. locomotive led to much lower growth rates in
Japan, growth rates so low in Europe that unemployment reached levels
inconceivable just a few years earlier, and to negative growth rates in much of
the debt-ridden Third World.
Meanwhile, the ever-lower dollar necessary to balance American exports and
imports threatened the existence of whole industries abroad. Foreign firms
faced losing their American markets, a market where they often sold more than
they sold at home. Lower American wages would inevitably put downward
pressures on Japanese and European wages.
What had been win-win from both the American and foreign perspective
increasingly looked like lose-lose from both perspectives. In response slowly
but surely the part of international trade that was managed by government
agreements started to rise.
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REQUIREMENTS OF A MULTI-POLAR INTEGRATED OPEN WORLD ECONOMY
To work a multi-polar integrated open world economy requires fiscal and
monetary coordination among the major countries, in this case West Germany,
Japan, and the United States. A common locomotive is needed and it can only
be provided if the major countries stimulate or restrict their economies in
unison.
There is no doubt that coordination can work. The world has just witnessed
a demonstration of what can happen if coordination is possible. In 1988 almost
every developed country will grow faster than it did in 1987, faster than it was
predicted to grow in September 1987, and much faster than it was predicted to
grow in November 1987. The coordinating event was, of course, the stock
market crash of October 1987. In the aftermath of that crash every
government envisioned its economy in a recession and all took prompt action to
stimulate. In concert the stimulation worked. Much like a Ferrarri when the
accelerator is depressed, forward movement was almost instantaneous. In
normal times, however, with uncoordinated feet on both brakes and accelerator,
not much happens.
"Coordination" is one of those words that is easy to say but hard to do.
For it means that each country must do things that
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it does not want to do. If they wanted to do it, it would be unnecessary to
ask for coordination
The current environment coordination requires the U.S. to balance its budget
to lower world interest rates. Americans want neither to raise taxes nor cut
government services. The West Germans must grow much faster over an
extended period of time but they don't want to grow faster and suck in
hundreds of thousands of guest workers. The Japanese must balance imports
and exports with more imports but they don't want to hurt the domestic
industries that must be harmed if imports are to rise by the tens of billions of
dollars necessary to balance international accounts.
To work, the world economy needs stahle crrency values. No one will make
the capital-intensive investments that are necessary for long-run rapid growth
if fluctuating currency values make it impossible to determine where such heavy
investments should be made to insure long-run profitability. Stability can be
gotten from a dominant currency in a single polar world but requires monetary
coordination so close in a multi-polar world that one might just as well have a
world currency and a world central bank. Yet no one is about to give up their
own central bank and replace it with a world central bank.
For the last decade the major countries of the world have demonstrated that
they will not, except under very special circumstances, coordinate. This reality
is not about to change.
A multi-polar open world economy also requires micro-economic
harmonization--a level playing field. In a single polar world harmonization isn't
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necessary since the very asymmetries of the relationship between the dominant
country and other countries provides the sources of gain. No level playing field
is necessary to prevent the charge of "foul."
Some of the necessary harmonization relates to government rules and
regulations such as taxes but much of it relates to differences in the traditional
ways in which business is done. Non-governmental non-tariff trade barriers
must also be eliminated.
Regulations such as those governing anti-trust and banking cannot be left to
each country. Japanese business groups with their interlocking ownership can
hold monthly meetings to plot strategy in both the Japanese and American
markets. American CEOs holding such a meeting would find themselves all in
jail regardless of whether they were talking about the Japanese or the
American market. But the opportunity to work out common
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strategies of conquest in home or foreign markets cannot be permitted to only
one side.
The German industrial system with pivotal bank holdings creates an economy
where it is much more difficult for Englishmen to buy German firms than it is
for Germans to buy English firms. Similarly, the very different Price/Earnings
ratios in the Japanese stock market make it practically impossible for anyone
to buy Japanese firms but financially easy for Japanese firms to buy almost
everyone. If countries are not to feel like losers and withdraw from an open
world economy, the ability to engage in hostile takeovers to acquire foreign
assets must be roughly symmetric.
if distribution systems are owned or controlled by producers in one country
(Japan), but open another (Holland), one set of exporters finds it much easier
to get his products on store shelves than another. Phillips complains that for
this reason it does not have equal access for its consumer products in Japan.
Labor practices likewise must be roughly similar. In an open world economy
the high minimum wages of Europe are threatened by the low minimum wages of
the United States. Long European vacations similarly are not viable given short
vacations in the Pacific Rim. Production simply moves to those parts of the
world where such benefits don't have to be paid thereby forcing such benefits
to be eliminated.
In an open world economy everyone has to be willing to live with "factor
price equalization"--a technical economic term but easily grasped. If you are
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no more skilled than a Korean, have no more capital than a Korean, and work
with no more technology than a Korean, then you will work for a Korean wage.
Under the pressures of factor price equalization, the real wages of American
non-supervisory workers have fallen 8 percent from their peak (1 percent in
1987) despite a growing economy.
Similarly, factor price equalization requires that if you are in the car
business and Mr. Honda is willing to work for a three percent rate of return on
capital that he has been willing to work for in the 14 years since Honda went
into the automobile business, then you must be better at producing cars than
Mr. Honda or be willing to work for the same three percent rate of return on
capital. And if real interest rates are above that level in the credit markets
where you borrow, then you have no choice but to close down.
It does not take profound analysis to understand that a profit-maximizing
American firm interested in the after-tax returns on capital assets will most of
the time lose out in the long run to a Japanese firm interested in maximizing
value added (the difference between selling revenue and the costs of purchased
materials and components).
Harmonization means that the Japanese must shift to the American system or
that the Americans must shift to the Japanese system. Either would require
major changes in the standard ways that Japanese or Americans do business.
Just as desired personal lifestyles differ from country to country so do
desired economic ways of life. But they cannot differ in a multi-polar
-11-
integrated open world economy. To make the Common Market work as a real
common market it must harmonize governmental and social non-tariff barriers.
What is true for Europe is true for the entire world. Free trade is a real
common market that requires just as much coordination and harmonization.
THE BOTTOM LINE
FACT: An integrated open multi-polar world economy cannot be made to work
without macro-economic coordination and micro-economic harmonization.
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FACT: Countries are unwilling to coordinate their macro-economic policies and
don't want to harmonize their micro-economic ways of life.
RESULTThe movement toward an integrated open world economy has come to
the end of the line.
A PRECIPITATING EVENT
The integration of the EEC in 1992 will be the event that destroys the post-
World War I movement toward a more integrated open world economy, but it
should more accurately be seen not as a causal event but as a precipitating
event. It will just make visible and speed up what would have occurred
anyway.
In 1992 Europe must harmonize its non-tariff barriers. In the process it is
going to become a much more restrictive market.
Consider the market for automobiles. The French strictly limit, the Italians
essentially prohibit, and the Dutch freely permit the sale of Japanese cars.
What are to be the common limits on Japanese cars after 1992? The rules will
not be the Dutch rules, the average of the dutch and Italian rules, or even the
French riles. They will be the Italian rules. The Italians
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will insist. And everyone else will explicitly or implicitly support their
stubbornness.
It does not take a European automotive genius to note that on neutral turf-
-the American market--the Japanese have scored what in boxing terms would be
a TKO. Fiat and Renault have been driven out of the U.S. market completely.
Volkswagen's market share is approaching the point where it will have no
choice but to leave, and the market shares of upscale European producers such
as Audi, Mercedes Benz, and BMW are rapidly eroding as the Japanese
competition moves upscale. What the Japanese can do in America they can, if
given a chance, do in Europe.
-nU'y fIrs t-cass sLJeI Vver also notes thLt tII Jdpdntese dre building more
production capacity in the U.S. than they can possibly use in America.
Europeans may find it easy to keep Japanese cars out of the United States but
they will find it much harder to keep American-built Japanese cars out of
Europe. If they do so, Europeans will jeopardize their current market for
luxury car exports to the United States and shake their military alliances with
the United States. What looks like a Japanese-European fight will quickly
become an American-European fight.
Beneath the current euphoria about 1992, where everyone talks as if they
will be a winner, there must at this moment be a set of studies underway.
Each company is asking its experts to determine whether it will be a winner or
a loser in 1992.
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If one looks at the distribution of firms in the United States and compares
it with the existing distribution of firms in Europe, about one-third of these
reports will come back with the conclusions that the firm commissioning the
report will be a winner and two-thirds will come back with the message that
the firm will be a loser.
If one looks at the distribution of economic activity in the United States, it
is also likely that large areas will be losers. Some American states are empty
and others have per capita incomes half the national average. Two-thirds of
America's 3000 counties are losing population. In a common market with free
labor mobility, workers must move to the most dynamic areas; economic
activity seldom moves to where the workers are currently located.
When these reports are completed, the losing firms and areas will go to
their governments or to the Common Market directly and demand redress-
compensation. But from whom is the compensation to be gotten? Why, from
outsiders, of course--that is by far the easiest political course.
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Europe has harmonized in one and only one area, agriculture, and this is
exactly what has happened. As far as outsiders are concerned the situation
after harmonization is far worse than anything existing in any individual
country before harmonization.
Foreign export markets in Europe after harmonization are going to be much
smaller than before harmonization. This would be somewhat true in the best of
cases (lowering barriers among insiders always raises the effective barriers on
outsiders) but what will happen will not be the best of cases. If the history
of the common market agricultural policies teaches any lesson, it teaches
outsiders to expect the worst.
When foreigners charge "Fortress Europe," Europeans counter with the
argument that they are only interested in reciprocity. It is important to
understand that although the two terms sound very different, they are in fact
identical.
Consider the ability of foreign banks to enter the Common Market. Under
the doctrine of reciprocity, Europe can keep American banks out of Europe on
the grounds that many American states do not permit interstate banking. If a
European bank does not have access to all of America, an American bank
cannot have access to Europe. Similarly, America does not allow banks to own
shares in industrial firms. If European banks are not to have that privilege in
America, then American banks cannot come to Europe where every bank has
such rights.
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Similarly, the Japanese cannot have access to the European retail system
unless the Japanese are willing to change their current system where producers
often control access to the retail market.
What are reciprocal subsidies? Europeans argue that direct Airbus subsidies
are equivalent to indirect American subsidies that come via the Defense
Department despite the fact that Boeing has no contracts for military airplanes.
Often, but not always, they are of course right. The Defense Department
investments in Sematech (a government-backed consortium to improve
semiconductor production capabilities) has no military purposes. It is clearly a
civilian industry policy hiding out as a military necessity designed to combat
the Japanese.
What does one do with Japan where the whole distinction between public and
private has little meaning? Are participating bonds investments equivalent to
European state ownership or are they subsidies not to be permitted? Is holding
down the real rate of interest on postal savings account a violation of
reciprocity or merely a legitimate policy to stimulate economic growth?
There are no technical answers to these questions. Reciprocity could mean
an open market or it could just as easily mean a closed market. In fact it
means a closed market. Repeatedly in my trips to Europe I hear over and over
again, "We are not going to let the Japanese do in Europe what they have
already done in the United States." But as the automobile illustrates,
separating the treatment of Japan from that of the United States is not going
to be easy. One cannot keep out Japanese products without keeping out
Japanese-American products. But where is the dividing line between American
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and Japanese-American products to be found?
Europe does not want to operate under the harsh dictates of factor price
equalization. It does not want to give up its economic way of life--its long
vacations, its high minimum wages, its generous social welfare system. Given
these desires it has no choice but to isolate itself and not give to outsiders
what it gives to insiders. Harmony within Europe is going to be difficult
enough without worrying about outsiders.
Since neither Japan nor America will be willing to change their economic
way of life and adopt the post-1992 European economic way of life (whatever
that is), 1992 is going to force the realization on everyone that the idea of an
integrated open multi-polar economy is an idea whose time is past.
Europe will be blamed for the failure but in fact no one on either side of
the Atlantic or Pacific is willing to do what would have to b- clone--change a
majority of their standard operating procedures to bring them into harmony
with the other two great polar blocks. For given the reality of two other
equals, no one could expect to play this traditional economic game more than
one-third of the time. Everyone would have to be prepared two-thirds of their
economic way of life.
No one is prepared to do so.
A WORLD OF TRADING BLOCKS
While economists always speak of trading blocks as if they were the ultimate
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disaster, they need not be so. Interblock trading will be managed by
governments, but they need not aim at eliminating it. There are real
comparative advantages to be taken advantage of between blocks that will not
require changes in lifestyles.
The economic losses from foregoing some of the advantages of comparative
advantage are apt to be much smaller than economic descriptions would lead
one to believe. The axiomatic advantages of free trade flow from the
assumption that human welfare is dependent upon one and only one variable--
the consumption goods and services that one can buy. In fact many other
economic factors, such as the nature of one's job, contribute to human
welfare. Man is a producing as well as a consuming animal. Economic welfare
is quite rationally sacrificed to by other goods such as a more egalitarian
society.
The axiomatic advantages of free trade also assume that full employment can
at all points be maintained and that transition costs do not exist. In fact few
countries have successfully maintained full employment in recent years and the
transition costs of moving human and physical resources from one industry to
another in response to the vagaries of world trade are often enormous.
This is especially true if one is dealing with man-made comparative
advantage--the dominant form of comparative advantage in the modern
technological age. The comparative advantages constructed by any one set of
humans can presumably be duplicated by others. If interblock trade is managed
even half intelligently the comparative advantages that automatically flow from
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differences in natural resource endowments or difference in factor proportions
can be maintained.
If greater degrees of block macro-economic coordination and micro-economic
harmonization emerge than wold be possible if the entire world had to
coordinate and harmonize, then the real economic gains within blocks will
undoubtedly swamp the hypothetical gains from an integrated open world
economy.
Put bluntly, the world might grow faster with blocks than without blocks--it
could hardly do worse than it has done thus far in the 1980s. An optimist
might in fact say that continental free trade is in fact a necessary step to
worlu IF trade.
Rather than quarreling about which block is the most restrictive and hence
causing the world to move toward trading blocks far better than accept the
reality of trading blocks and get on about the job of understanding how we
might manage trade between the blocks os that it doesn't deteriorate into the
negative-sum games of the 1930s.
The best, especially when it is both impossible to obtain and not obviously
that much better, should never stand in the way of the good.
Let us raise a toast to the success of trading blocks.
